Under modern law, federal legislation is subject to "rational basis review" under the doctrinal rubric of "substantive due process."
authority is bound to act in accordance with the direct instructions of the principal and, in the absence of such direct instructions, must abide by a set of default fiduciary obligations to the principal, such as a duty to exercise personal judgment, a duty of loyalty to the principal, and a duty of care when acting on behalf of the principal.
1 Accordingly, both you and the law would expect the agent under such a fiduciary instrument to manage the principal's affairs prudently, thoughtfully, and carefully, and the law would enforce that expectation with stiff penalties. The same expectation, again backed up by the threat of stiff legal sanctions, holds across an entire family of fiduciary relationships, such as child/guardian, businessperson/factor, and corporation/officer. A fiduciary's duty of care is one of the most basic principles of agency law.
It is also one of the most basic principles underlying the United States Constitution.
While all of the prior examples of fiduciary obligations refer to private law rather than public law, the law of agency is very pertinent -and, indeed, crucial -to understanding the relationship between the United States government and the people over whom it exercises jurisdiction.
Federal officials, from the President to members of Congress to federal judges, receive constitutionally delegated discretionary authority over a wide range of subjects. The constitutional text allocates various powers to governmental actors, and it prescribes mechanisms of oversight and supervision of those actors ranging from elections to impeachment proceedings.
The document, however, does not generally describe in any detail the manner in which discretionary authority must be exercised. Nonetheless, as a matter of the Constitution's original meaning, 2 all federal powers must be implemented with the thoughtfulness, care, and prudence that would be required of a private-law fiduciary in analogous circumstances. Translating that fiduciary duty into ordinary language: All exercises of federal power must be reasonable. This conclusion does not derive from the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which as an interpretative matter simply cannot sustain any such load, or indeed from any other specific constitutional provision. It derives instead from the very nature of the Constitution.
In a forthcoming book from the University Press of Kansas entitled "A Great Power of
Attorney": Understanding the Fiduciary Constitution 3 , we demonstrate at length that the Constitution is most accurately viewed, for purposes of its interpretation, as a kind of fiduciary instrument --and specifically as a "great power of attorney," to use the language of the foundingera giant James Iredell. 4 The legal maker of the Constitution, identified in the Preamble as "We 2 By "original meaning," we mean the communicative signals intended to be conveyed by the Constitution's legal author, who is identified by the document itself as the hypothetical entity "We the general public in that era was far more acquainted with fiduciary instruments than is the general public today. The more one looks at founding-era fiduciary documents, the more one sees them reflected in the United States Constitution.
There were many kinds of eighteenth-century agency instruments, including powers of attorney and corporate charters, from which provisions of the Constitution could have been -and rather clearly were -drawn. In the book, we argue that there is a stronger case for seeing the Constitution as akin to a power of attorney than for seeing it as some other kind of fiduciary instrument, such a corporate charter, though that case is considerably less decisive than is the 5 U.S. CONST. Preamble. 6 Id. ("We the People of the United States in Order to form a more perfect Union, to establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America"). For purposes of this article, it does not matter whether one analogizes the Constitution to a power of attorney, a corporate charter, or any other specific kind of fiduciary instrument (though that distinction might very well matter in other contexts). If the Constitution is best understood and interpreted as any kind of agency instrument at all, it follows inexorably that there are unenumerated but nonetheless constitutionally grounded limitations on virtually all of the authority exercised by governmental actors. Those constraints affect the manner in which those powers must be exercised, and they determine on whose behalf the exercise must take place.
Understanding the Constitution as a species of agency instrument provides at least an outline for understanding how and why these constraints are present. When agents receive delegated authority, they receive that authority subject to a set of presumptive legal obligations to exercise their authority in a certain way and on behalf of certain beneficiaries. Acceptance of the role of agent, as understood in founding-era English common law, entailed a commitment to provide service to the principal. Agents cannot use their power as they please, because the power is not really their own; they are legally constrained by the very fact that they are acting as agents, not in their personal capacities as private individuals. The agents' duties of, inter alia, care and loyalty form part of the background law of agency, and those duties will govern relationships created by any particular agency instrument unless there is something in the instrument that says otherwise. Nothing in the Constitution says otherwise.
Modern law, to a modest extent, recognizes this overarching requirement of reasonableness in federal action, but it tends to locate it in the textually unpromising interstices of the Due Process Clause and it does not necessarily calibrate the requirement of reasonableness to the precise duty of care that the Constitution actually contemplates. Under the rubric of "substantive due process," all federal legislation must meet a minimum requirement of rationality, though that minimum is so low that any imaginable rationale is considered sufficient to sustain federal action unless the action implicates some judicially favored interests. The idea that executive officers, such as the President, might be constitutionally bound to exercise due care, loyalty, and impartiality in the exercise of their functions is not, or should not be, at all a startling conclusion. We have previously reached essentially that same result through a different path than we pursue here, 15 though in the end the two paths converge. The privatelaw background of agency that informs the Constitution elegantly dovetails with a related publiclaw background of obligations, such as those of due care, which we here summarize only briefly.
Through that public-law background, which began at least almost two centuries before the Constitution was ratified, some basic principles of agency law were finding their way into the legal norms regarding governmental administration.
By the time of the framing of the Constitution, there was a substantial body of English administrative law governing delegations of power to governmental bodies. One of the most basic principles underlying this law was the notion that grants of discretionary authority to 12 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (emphasis added). 14 When and whether constitutional violations of the duty of care are impeachable offenses is a separate question that would require another article. We note the issue without resolving it. 15 See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 10.
executive agents had to be exercised reasonably, even when that requirement was not spelled out in the grant.
This principle regarding the reasonable exercise of delegated governmental power is typically traced to the 1598 decision in Rooke's Case. 16 A statute gave sewer commissioners the power to assess landowners for the costs of repairing water-control projects as the commissioners "shall deem most convenient to be ordained." 17 The commissioner used this statute to assess the full costs of a repair on a single landowner, even though other landowners were also benefited by the project. The court ruled for the assessed landowner because We do not disagree with these arguments. We simply maintain that they are subsumed under, and superseded by, the more basic point about the fiduciary character of the Constitution.
power to the President are sufficient to provide a constitutional foundation for viewing the President as a constrained agent rather than a free actor.
None of that says, of course, what the President's duty of care entails in specific circumstances. As we have intimated, there may not be a general answer to that kind of question, given the contextual character of agency relationships. 37 We will say more about the broad outlines of a constitutionally grounded fiduciary duty of care when we get to Congress shortly.
Federal Judges' Duty of Care
What about federal judges? Are they also subject to fiduciary duties because they exercise a delegated "judicial Power" 38 ? Of course they are. Other scholars have tried to use agency theory to formulate a general theory of judging in the American political order, 39 but we are not going that far. We are only trying to interpret the meaning of the "judicial Power" in the context of the federal Constitution. And in that context, agency law has much to say:
Suppose that a federal judge exercises his or her delegated power to decide a case by consulting an Ouija board. The judge's decision could certainly be reversed on appeal. The judge could certainly be impeached and removed by Congress. But more profoundly, the judge has violated the Constitution. There is nothing in Article III that expressly says that judges must decide cases rationally or sensibly, but given the eighteenth-century background norms regarding delegated governmental power, there would be no need for such a specification. Courts are delegated the judicial power, which includes as a necessary element the discretionary power to choose a decision-making methodology. It would simply be taken as given by a founding-era reasonable observer that the delegation to the courts, although seemingly without any internal textual limit, carries the implicit requirement that the power be exercised reasonably. There is substantial room within that grant of power for different methodologies, and even substantial room for error that does not rise to a constitutional violation, but at some point a judgment falls so far off the map that it simply ceases to be an exercise of the judicial power. Put another way: Not everything done by a judge, even in the guise of deciding a case, is an exercise of judicial power (or jurisdiction) within the meaning of Article III. The limits may be broad, but there are limits.
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As we noted above, Ethan Leib, David Ponet, and Michael Serota have argued that all American judges, both state and federal, are subject to basic fiduciary duties, and they have sought to derive a robust theory of proper behavior from the nature of the judicial role as established in England and the North-American colonies (if not more widely). They seek to identify "fiduciary duties that . . . are widely applicable to all judges." 41 We do not disagree with their general characterization of the role of judges; after all, until fairly recently in AngloAmerican legal history judges were considered a kind of executive official, and we have just seen that there is a long tradition of holding executive officials to fiduciary standards. We agree that fiduciary principles are a powerful way in which to ground familiar ideals of judicial 40 Lawson & Seidman, supra note 10, at 132. 41 Leib, Ponet & Serota, supra note 39, at 730. impartiality 42 and responsibility. 43 We are less persuaded that one can derive a judicial duty of "deliberative engagement" with the public. 44 Federal judges are charged with a very specific task -deciding cases or controversies in accordance with governing law -and it is far from obvious how deliberative engagement uniformly promotes that task. But in this article we do not claim principles beyond those that we have identified here as applicable to federal judges by virtue of their constitutional office. Such principles may well exist, but we do not claim them here. And again, the scope of the appropriate duty of care requires more explanation.
We shall now see, in the context of Congress, how much guidance one can draw about that duty from background principles of agency law.
Congress's Duty of Care
The principle of reasonableness in English administrative law applied to agents exercising authority delegated from Parliament, but Parliament itself was not bound by that principle because Parliament did not exercise delegated authority; it was supreme. "Indeed, the law imposed no substantive limits, of reasonableness or otherwise, on the legislative supremacy of Parliament, which stood above the other two governmental departments in the legal hierarchy." Id. at 736-39.
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Id. at 740-52.
Under the American Constitution, however, Congress exercises delegated authority just as does the President and the federal judiciary. Once it is seen that the Constitution is fundamentally an agency instrument, there is no reason to exempt some of the designated agents from the background norms that accompany agency instruments absent some specific provision in the instrument that explicitly overrides those background norms. Accordingly, it is evident that Congress is also bound by a duty of care when it exercises discretionary authority. If an agent is charged with managing or spending another person's money, of course the agent must exercise due care when dealing with those assets. Congress manages money -a staggeringly enormous amount of money -on behalf of We the People and its posterity. The idea that
Congress has a duty of care when executing that task, and its other constitutionally delegated tasks, is almost too elementary to articulate.
Put in interpretative terms: All of the power grants in the Constitution come with an implicit coda to the effect of: "to be exercised in a reasonable fashion in accordance with basic fiduciary norms." The fiduciary duty of care is part of the interpretative background of the document. The real question for us concerns the scope and content of that duty.
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In our forthcoming book, we spend considerable energy discussing whether the Constitution is best seen as a kind of power of attorney or as some other kind of fiduciary instrument, such as a corporate charter. There are strong similarities between the Constitution and corporate charters of the eighteenth century, so we readily concede that the case for viewing the Constitution in corporate terms is quite powerful 47 (though in the end we think less powerful than the case for viewing it as a power of attorney). It is an intriguing question whether the precise characterization of the Constitution as a specific kind of fiduciary instrument might make a difference in the content of the norm of due care. In the end, we think that it most likely does not matter, but the considerations involved are subtle enough to warrant a close look, especially as those considerations point towards the appropriate standard of care that is incorporated into the Constitution as a background rule of interpretation.
Suppose that one thinks that the Constitution can be analogized to a corporate charter. In that case, one might reason that agents such as Congress are best viewed as corporate directors who determine the general path of the enterprise (and executive and judicial officials might be analogized to managers, though they might fit the role of directors as well for certain designated tasks). Under basic principles of modern-day corporate law, the directors are subject to fiduciary duties of care, but their exercise of discretionary judgment is evaluated pursuant to the so-called "business judgment rule," in which there is "a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. A hallmark of the business judgment rule is that a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board if the latter's decision can be 'attributed to any rational business purpose. ' " 48 This suggests that the constitutionally implied duty of care, while quite real, is highly deferential to the extent that such a duty conforms to contemporary practice under corporate law. But from the standpoint of original meaning, contemporary practice is not the place to look for the appropriate duty of care. This is a much more difficult question to answer than it might at first seem. Our present bottom line is actually that the duty of care that forms an interpretative backdrop for understanding all constitutionally vested powers is in fact approximated reasonably well by the modern business judgment rule. It is possible for decisions of governmental actors to be so far outside the normal range of discretion that they amount to a breach of this bedrock fiduciary duty, but the standard is much more forgiving than one of simple error, and it probably does not even reach the "prudent person" standard that modern fiduciary law would likely apply to a wide range of contemporary agency relationships. But, as we will shortly see, that does not necessarily make the standard equivalent to so-called "rational basis" analysis under current constitutional doctrine. The business judgment rule, today and in the eighteenth century, is highly deferential, but it is not a free pass.
Start with the eighteenth-century duty of care of fiduciaries outside of the corporate setting. The law in that regard seems to have been relatively thin. Partly that is a function of the splintered character in earlier times of what today we call fiduciary law, which did not exist as a unified, unitary body of doctrine in the founding era. Executors, guardians, and factors, for example, each had their own standards to meet, and generalizing across those standards is difficult, in part because cases are likely to turn on the language of particular instruments and the specific facts presented.
Professor Robert Natelson has studied this question of founding-era fiduciary standards for far longer and in far more depth than have we, and he concludes regarding the common threads among the various eighteenth-century understandings of duties of care: "The 'reasonable man' standard seems not to have been in use yet, but the duty was expressed as an obligation not to neglect the business nor to be guilty of 'folly or negligence' or, in some cases, as an obligation to avoid 'supine' or 'extreme' negligence or crassa neglegentia (gross negligence). If a fiduciary acted in an 'unreasonable or indiscrete' way, a court . . . also could hold fiduciaries liable . . . ."
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This relatively deferential standard actually makes a great deal of sense for an era in which fiduciaries were often not professionals but were simply ordinary citizens acting as executors, guardians, and the like. 50 An overly strict standard of care would make serving in those positions very risky, and the social costs of discouraging people from serving in those fiduciary capacities would have been enormous. A "business judgment" rule as a baseline (from which any instrument could, if it so chose, depart in either direction) is an understandable first approximation of a generalized fiduciary standard of care in the eighteenth century.
Was that business judgment norm also the eighteenth-century standard of care for corporate directors and officers, so that the interpretative result would be the same whether one sees the Constitution as a power of attorney or as a corporate charter? 51 That is an even harder question to answer because there appears to be relatively little founding-era law on the fiduciary duties of corporate directors. The corporation itself was a fiduciary for its owners and was even deemed to hold the stock of its owners as a trustee. purposes, as an asset of the corporation, and the stockholders were beneficiaries of the resulting equitable trust. The idea that the stock actually belongs to the stockholders rather than the corporate entity did not gain broad acceptance until the early nineteenth century.
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This conception of the corporation as an owner and trustee came out in 1723 in Child v.
Hudson's Bay Co., 53 in which both the corporation and an outside creditor made claims on the stock of a bankrupt stockholder. The corporation had a by-law stating that if any member (stockholder) of the company incurred a debt to the corporation, the stock was to be used first to satisfy the debt to the corporation. The outside creditor denied that the corporation could, through a by-law, effectively make itself a secured creditor. The court ruled in favor of the corporation: "This is a good bye-law; for the legal interest of all the stock is in the company, who are trustees for the several members . . . ." 54 Once the company is identified as a trustee, then of course background fiduciary principles come into play. We have, however, found little elaboration of the content of those principles in the corporate law context, especially in regard to the duty of care.
In addition, there was some eighteenth-century authority for imposing fiduciary duties directly on the directors and officers of corporations in their personal capacities. The most illuminating case that we have identified is Charitable Corporation v. Sutton. 55 The case concerned a massive fraud against the company, which had been created as a lending institution, perpetrated by some of its officers. at the center of the fraud, which involved issuing loans (often to the officer himself) far in excess of the company's assets. 56 Thompson had "run away out of the kingdom in order to avoid justice," 57 and the company sought to hold the committee-men, who would be the equivalent of modern directors, liable for the losses. There were allegations of nonfeasance in failing to monitor the situation and for malfeasance in appointing some of the perpetrators to positions of authority. The basic claim of the plaintiffs, as described by the court, was that the defendant committee-men "have been guilty of manifest breaches of trust, or at least of such supine and gross negligence of their duty, and so often repeated, that it will amount to a breach of trust."
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The court found the committee-men clearly liable for "actual breaches of trust" for several events:
The bye-law prescribes, that when notes were to be issued by the cashier, they should be signed by one of the committee-men, and intended as a check upon the warehouse-keeper and cashier. Now several notes have been issued, without observing this rule, which is an express contravention of the bye-law.
A registry of pledges was kept, in which an entry is made of the value of the goods pawned: after this was done, a new loan is made upon the same pledge, to the same person, and a reference to the old number in the registry upon every new advance; so that it may be called a pedigree of loans through twenty descents.
56 The corporation's charter specifically forbade this kind of fractional-reserve banking. See id. (noting that the corporate charter "restrains the company from banking, unless with notes payable on demand, and confined within the amount of the stock").
57 Id. at 643. 58 Id.
Now it is not in the nature of the thing possible to suppose, that the same person wanting to re-borrow could replace the first money lent; and therefore at the out-set was a plain and obvious fraud.
. . . .
As to the third breach of trust, the committee-men's behavior, with regard
to Thompson their warehouse-keeper.
It is such a notorious fraud, or at least gross inattention, to suffer him, who was to set a value on all the pledges, to borrow money upon them himself; that, I
shall direct those who shall appear to be guilty of it to make good the loss.
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"Gross inattention" in supervision thus amounted to a breach of trust. The best summary that we can exact from these materials is that eighteenth-century fiduciaries generally, whether attorneys or corporate directors, had a duty of care as a baseline part of their obligations, but that the standard of care that could be legally enforced was akin to a standard of gross negligence. To the extent that the Constitution is a fiduciary instrument, of any plausible kind to which it can be analogized, federal actors must exercise their discretion at least in accordance with this standard. Interestingly, that conclusion is not very far removed from ideas that are central to modern constitutional law, though modern law does not ground its principles in fiduciary notions or conform to them precisely. The contemporary business judgment rule in corporate law is often cast as a "rational basis" test, in which the decision of a board of directors will be upheld if it "can be attributed to any rational business purpose," 71 though the standard is also sometimes framed as one of "gross negligence," as was the evident eighteenth-century standard. 72 For students of American constitutional law, the term "rational basis" has immediate resonance.
In 1938, the Supreme Court famously declared that congressional legislation that did not implicate certain judicially-favored interests (which today are generally called "fundamental rights") "is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators." 73 Four years earlier, in a case involving state rather than federal legislation, the Court said: "If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied." 74 The clear implication is that legislation is to be pronounced unconstitutional if it cannot be assumed to rest upon a rational basis or to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose. That is, the implication is that there is a general background norm of rationality with which any legislation must comply.
While it may be difficult to find legislation that is so absurd that it will not sustain a presumption of legislative rationality (just as it may be difficult to find business decisions so preposterous that no presumption of responsible judgment can be indulged with respect to them), it is not impossible to do so. The Supreme Court has even found a federal statute refusing to recognize state definitions of marriage that include same-sex couples to be irrational and therefore invalid, 75 though the case obviously implicated other, more particularized concerns even if the decision did not precisely identify them. Numerous cases announce the rational basis standard while finding it satisfied.
It is very difficult to find a textual hook for this kind of "rational basis review," as it has come to be called. The cases involving action by state officials typically invoke the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but even if that was a plausible ground for such a requirement in the context of state actors, there is no express Equal Protection Clause applicable to the federal government. 76 Certainly the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is an unlikely home for it, for reasons that have oft been given about the implausibility of "substantive due process" as an interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. 77 The background duty of care imposed by fiduciary theory, however, just might fit the bill. Indeed, the eighteenth-century duty of care may even be slightly more rigorous than modern "rational basis" review, though that is hard to glean with any confidence from the eighteenth-century law. The founding-era cases support a fiduciary standard of gross negligence.
Modern rational basis inquiry excuses even gross negligence; it allows laws to stand if one can imagine a rationale for them, even if the actors did not actually formulate or rely upon that rationale. Agency law arguable demands a bit more than modern rational basis inquiry provides.
In any event, once government actors are seen as fiduciaries of any sort at all, the idea that their actions are entirely unconstrained by law other than express prohibitions in the governing instrument is quite absurd. Any such result would have to come from an explicit statement in a document that the governing background law of fiduciary instruments was superseded. There is nothing in the United States Constitution even resembling such a provision. Substantive due process may well be an oxymoron, and also an implausible interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, but from the standpoint of original meaning rational basis review of federal legislation has a very potent constitutional pedigree. And, as we have seen, the case for imposing such a standard on federal executive and judicial officials is at least as strong. If
Congress is bound by fiduciary standards, then a fortiori so are the President and federal judges.
The reasonableness requirement of fiduciary law also suggests that there is no good reason to think that executive officials should be held to a lower standard of rationality than are legislators, as modern case law would have it. 78 Federal actors are all agents, each charged with specific tasks. The nature of the tasks lead to differences in the application of fiduciary standards, but it is far from obvious that some tasks call for a lower standard than others, 79 it is far from obvious that corporate officers should be subject to a different fiduciary standard than corporate directors.
Conclusion
The idea that federal governmental action should, as an ideal, be reasonable is not especially controversial. But finding a textually grounded constitutional basis for turning that desideratum into an actual legal norm has been a different story. Once the Constitution is seen as an agency instrument, however, the requirement of reasonableness follows quite easily as a matter of original meaning -not from a specific textual provision but from the nature of the text itself. One does not need the oxymoronic label "substantive due process" to describe this reasonableness requirement. It derives from the basic fiduciary duty of care.
We hasten to add that it is an entirely different question from those that we address here whether state laws or state executive or judicial officials are subject to a constitutionally grounded reasonableness review. Modern law unquestionably subjects state actors to some such standard via the Fourteenth Amendment, but it is not at all clear that this practice is (or is not)
constitutionally grounded under our analysis. Because the Constitution does not generally empower state officials and state legislators (with some modest exceptions 80 ), those actors are not subject to the background fiduciary standards that underlie the federal Constitution when they act within the compass of their state authority. It is possible that their own state constitutions impose those standards, but that is something that would have to be determined on
